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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

vs.
HAL J. LANE,

Case No.
8210

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent is in substantial agreement as to the
material facts set forth by the appellant in the statement
contained in his brief. These facts will be further discussed
in connection with the argument of the respondent in support of the points contained herein.·

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE ON
THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE AD-
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DUCED BY THE STATE AS CORROBORATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCOMPLICES WAS INSUFFICIENT· AS A MATTER
O·F LAW.
POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE ON
THE GROUNDS THAT THE FACTS ADDUCED
BY THE STATE DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN
OFFENSE UNDER 76-27-7, U. C. A. 1953, AND
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A FICTITIOUS CHECK
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LAW.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6 TO THE JURY
WHEREIN THE JURY WAS ADVISED AS TO
ITS FUNCTION IN DETERMINING T·HE NECESSITY AND EXTENT OF TESTIMONY IN
CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE ON
THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE AS CORROBORATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCOMSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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PLICES WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
O,F LAW.
The conviction of the defendant as a principal for the
offense charged in the information and indictment is based
upon the provisions of 76-1-44, U. C. A. 1953, which provides in part :
"All persons concerned in the commission of a
crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether they
directly commit the act constituting the offense or
aid and abet in its commission or, not being present,
have advised and encouraged its commission, * * *
are principals in any crime so committed."
The evidence adduced by the State showed the commission
of the crime of issuing a fraudulent paper. In addition to
a showing that such a crime had been committed, there was
conclusively established the fact that the defendant was a
party to the offense and, in fact, the primary instigator.
The evidence disclosed the testimony of two accomplices
together with sufficient corroborative evidence to support
the conviction obtained in the lower court. The accomplices, Hanley and Clouse, testified in substantially the
same manner as to the existence of a plan or scheme whereby certain fictitious instruments had been made and uttered.
The type and amount of corroborative evidence required to support the conviction is set forth in 77-31-18,
U. C. A. 1953:
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other
evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the
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corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely
shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." (Emphasis added.)
We particularly direct the court's attention to the language
emphasized. An examination of the transcript discloses
that sufficient evidence was adduced tending to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime of making and
uttering a fraudulent paper. The defendant is charged
with making and uttering the instrument designated in the
transcript as Exhibit 2, this instrument having been passed
at a Safeway Store in Sugar House, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The testimony of the accomplices disclosed that pursuant
to the plan and scheme entered into between themselves
and the defendant they did make and utter Exhibit 2, together with certain other instruments. The details of the
plan and scheme developed as follows : Hanley opened the
bank account in a fictitious name. Thereupon he, with the
help and assistance of Clouse and the defendant Lane, and
under the immediate direction of Lane, prepared the instruments with the felonious intent of defrauding third
persons. The actual typing and signing of the instruments
was done by the defendant. It was shown that one check
was passed at Safeway Stores and that in connection therewith groceries were purchased. A second check was passed
at the Paris Company and in connection with this there
was purchased a wallet. The testimony of the accomplices
was to the effect that the acts were done and the purchases
made under express instructions from the defendant.
As corroboration of the accomplices' testimony it was
shown that a wallet found in the possession of the defen-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

dant during his confinement in jail was one which had
been identified by the accomplice as the same piece of
merchandise as the accomplice had himself purchased at
the request of th_e defendant and in connection with the
passing of the fraudulent instrument. It would appear that
where an accomplice states affirmatively that he purchased
certain merchandise with a fraudulent instrument at the
instruction of another (the defendant) and that thereafter
the merchandise was found to be in the possession of the
other, such possession serves to corroborate the accomplice's
testimony.
An examination of the signature card of the bank,
Exhibit 1, shows that it has a different signature, dis-similar in every respect from that appearing on the fraudulent
instrument (Exhibit 2). Thus it is apparent that the applicant for the bank account (Hanley) did not alone make
the check. This being the case, the finger of guilt must
point to another person, as it does by reason of the testimony of the accomplice as corroborated by the other witnesses for the State. The appellant takes the position that
the Paris Company incident can be shown only for the
purpose of showing a course of action, scheme or plan, and
that it is available for this purpose only upon the further
showing that it was false or fraudulent. In support of this
position appellant cites the case of People v. Nitzberg, 287
N. Y. 183, 38 N. E. 2d 490, 40 N. E. 2d 40. In this same
case, however, the court set forth a wide and variable rule.
In the language of the court :
"There is a princi pie-not so much a rule of
evidence as a presupposition involved in the very
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conception of a rational system of evidence * * *
-which forbids receiving anything irrelevant, not
logically probative." Thayer, Preliminary Treatise
on Evidence, 264, 265.
"It is not the law which furnishes the test of
relevancy, but logic. Probative value, or capability
of supporting an inference, is a matter of reasoning
* * * and the rules of relevancy aim only to determine whether a given fact is of sufficient probative value to be admissible at all." 1 Greenleaf on
The Law of Evidence, Wigmore's 16th Ed., § 14.
"For the purposes of the present case it is
enough in the way of a definition of relevancy to
say that a fact is relevant to another fact when the
existence of the one renders the existence of the
other highly probable, according to the· common
course of events." See Sir James Stephen, Digest of
the Law of Evidence, Chase's 2d Ed., Introduction
XVIII. Cf. Platner v. Platner, 78 N. Y. 90, 94.
While respondent does not dispute that the established rule
of evidence to the effect that evidence of one crime may not
be shown in corroboration of a separate offense, we feel
that the rule may be more broadly stated. Evidence of one
crime may not be shown to corroborate a second crime
unless it may do so independently of the criminal elements
contained in the separate offense. In other words, if the
first crime is corroborative of facts adduced, regardless of
whether or not such evidence is itself a separate offense,
it should be admissible.
As further evidence in support of the conviction of the
defendant the state brought forth testimony of the arresting officer to the effect that at the time the defendant was
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arrested there was found within the automobile, of which he
was the sole occupant, several other checks (Exhibit 3).
A comparison of these checks with the one subject of this
prosecution discloses that all were similar in nature and
were signed in the same hand. It is significant that just
shortly before the arrest, the Safeway check was passed
and, in connection therewith, as herein noted, groceries
were purchased. Miscellaneous groceries were found in the
automobile where the arrest was made. A third aspect to
consider in determining whether or not there existed sufficient corroboration is the testimony of the Mr. Andrus
relating the fervent denial of any acquaintance by the defendant with the accomplices (Tr. 98) and the subsequent
contradiction wherein he admitted such an acquaintance
(Tr. 99). This, too, would serve to strengthen the inference
of guilt.
The question of vvhat type and how much corroboration
is necessary has been discussed by our Utah courts on many
occasions. It has been said that the statute does not require corroboration in respect to every material fact but
only in respect to such of the material facts as constitute
the necessary element of the crime charged. The corroborated evidence need not be sufficient of itself to establish
the guilt of the defendant but it must, in some degree, tend
to implicate him in and connect him with the commission
of the offense charged. State v. Spencer, 15 Utah 149, 49
Utah 302; State v~ Collett, 20 Utah 290, 58 P. 684. It has
been held that it is not essential that the corroborative
evidence be sufficient of itself to support the verdict of
guilt nor is it essential that the testimony of the accomplice
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be corroborated on every 1naterial point. But it is sufficient if the testimony of the accomplice· is corroborated as
to some material fact and the corroborative evidence, in and
of itself, and without the aid of the testimony of accomplices, tends to connect the defendant with the commission
of the offense. State v. Lay, 38 U. 143, 110 P. 986; State
v. Stewart, 57 U. 224, 193 P. 855; State v. Cox, 74 U. 149,
277 P. 972, and cases cited were followed and approved in
State v. Bruner~ 106 U. 49, 145 P. 2d 302. The facts and
circumstances of the case, if sufficiently cogent, may con··
stitute corroboration. State v. Park, 44 Utah 360, 140 P.
768. See also State v. Frisby, 49 U. 227, 162 P. 616; State
v. Erwin, 101 U. 365, 120 P. 2d 285, and cases cited; State
v. Petralia, ... U .... , 221 P. 2d 873.
POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE ON
THE GROUNDS THAT THE FACTS ADDUCED
BY THE STATE DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN
OFFENSE UNDER 76-27-7, U. C. A. 1953, AND
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A FICTITIOUS CHECK
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LAW.
The defendant Lane was properly charged with the
commission of the crime of issuing a fraudulent instrument.
The facts adduced· did properly set forth the necessary
elements of the offense as prescribed by statute. The statute under which the defendant is accused· provides:
"Every person who makes, passes, utters, or
publishes, with intention to defraud any other per-
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son, or who, with like intention, attempts to pass,
utter or publish, or who has in his possession, with
like intent to utter, pass or publish, any fictitious
bill, note or check, purporting to be the bill, note,
check or other instrument in writing for the payment of money or property of some bank, corporation, partnership or individual when in fact there
is no such bank, corporation, partnership or individual in existence, knowing the bill, note, check or
instrument. in writing to be fictitious, is punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for not less
than one nor more than ten years."
The position of the appellant is to the effect that he was
not guilty of issuing a fraudulent paper but, in fact, and
ironically enough, was merely doing business with an assumed name. Such a position is not founded in fact nor in
logic. We do not deny that Kevin Hanley assumed the name
Walter Stevenson, but we submit that he did so under the
direction of the defendant and with a pre-conceived intent
to defraud. Hanley's testimony (Tr. 48 & 49) was as follows:
"Q. What name, if any, did Mr. Lane tell you
the account should be opened in?
"A. Right at that time there wasn't any name.
"Q. Did you subsequently open such an account, you, yourself?
"A. Yes, I did.
"Q .. Did Mr. Lane say anything to you with

respect to how you were to open it, and in what name
you were to open it?
"A. Yes, he told me to open it in a business
account, in the bank, in the name of Walter Stevenson.
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Did you know anybody by the name of
Walter Stevenson?
"A. No.
"Q. Had you ever used the name Walter Stevenson before?
"A. No sir.
"Q. Have you used it since?
"A. No sir.
"Q. Do you consider yourself as Walter Stevenson?
"A. No sir."
"Q.

The accomplice, Hanley, by his own admission, assumed
the name for the express purpose of defrauding third persons. The name selected was fictitious in the mind of the
accomplice and by inference must necessarily have been
so in the mind of the defendant. Contrary to the position
of the appellant, Walter Stevenson was a non-existent individual. He was not present in the,courtroom nor was he
known to exist by any of the principals. The name Walter
Stevenson was selected for the admitted purpose of committing a fraud. Appellant argues that a person may freely
assume any name or such names as suit his desires or
fancy. Such a rule is in every instance subject to the reservation that no person may assume such a name with the
intent to defraud others. Sec. 38 Am. Jur. 601.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6 TO THE JURY
WHEREIN THE JURY WAS ADVISED AS TO
ITS FUNCTION IN DETERMINING THE NE-
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CESSITY AND EXTENT OF TESTilVIONY IN
CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES.
The appellant takes exception to that part of the court's
instruction number 6 which follows:
"Under the law of this State a principal accused
of crime cannot be convicted of such crime on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Therefore, if you find in this case from the evidence that
the witness Hanley was an accomplice in the commission of the crime charged in the information, if
you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt that such crime was committed, then you are
instructed that you cannot convict the defendant on
the testimony of Hanley, unless you further find
that his testimony is corroborated by other evidence
which in itself and without the aid of the testimony
of said Hanley tends to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense."
In addition, the appellant assigns as error the failure of
the court to grant defendant's requested instructions number 1 and 2. The basis of their objection is that there
exists by necessary implication the right of the jury to
determine whether or not the witness Clouse and Hanley
were accomplices. In effect, appellant's position is that the
jury could determine, if they saw fit, that Hanley and
Clouse were not accomplices and therefore could give undue
weight to the witnesses' testimony without supporting corroborative evidence.
We submit that appellant's position is not sound and,
in support thereof, direct the court's attention to instruction
number 10, as follows:
"These instructions are to be considered altogether as a whole, and not as if each instruction
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were a complete statement of the law by itself. And
even though a rule, direction or thought is stated
in different ways and. repeated in more than one
instruction you should not give it undue importance.
You should not single out any one sentence, point or
instruction and give it undue emphasis and ignore
others. But you should consider all of the instructions as a whole and apply them all to the evidence
in the light of all of the instructions."
By this instruction the jury was charged· with the obligation of considering all instructions given by the court in
their proper light, weighing each one together and not as
separate dis-organized statements of law. Having the foregoing instruction in mind, the jury was further charged in
instruction 6 as follows :
"You are instructed· that all persons concerned
in the commission of a crime, whether they directly
commit the act constituting the offense or aid and
abet in its commission, are principals in any crime
so committed and are equally guilty of the commission of such crime. Likewise all persons concerned
in the commission of a crime, whether they directly
commit the act constituting the offense or aid and
abet in its comn1ission, are accomplices, each to the
other or others so engaged therein, and where two
persons acting with a common intent jointly engage
in the same undertaking and jointly commit an unlawful act each is an accomplice of the other in the
commission of such unlawful act."
The court then proceeded in the same instruction to instruct the jury in the language herein assigned as error.
The jury properly performed their function as charged.
It considered all of the instructions together as a body and
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not as if each instruction were a complete statement by
itself. The jury was properly advised as to what considerations should be given to the status of the witnesses. The
jury had heard the evidence and the admissions of the witnesses. This knowledge, as it was interpreted by the instruction number 6, should and undoubtedly did sufficiently
advise the jury of the law. The fact that the court used
the language "if you find in this case from the evidence
that the witnesses Hanley and Clouse were accomplices"
does not open the door to prejudicial error. The jury had
been advised as to what constituted an accomplice. They
had heard the testimony of the witnesses and were in an
informed position to determine for themselves that the
witnesses were accomplices. The requested instructions
were granted in substance, if not in the entirety. Such being
the case no prejudice resulted to the defendant from the
instruction given or from the failure of the court to give
the instructions requested. See Patterson v. State, 279 P.
356, 44 Cr. 64.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence adduced
In this case does support the verdict rendered, that the
verdict is in full compliance with law, and that no error
prejudicial to the defendant was committed by the court.
The verdict should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,

Attorney General,
EARL S. SPAFFORD,

Assistant Attorney General.
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